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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff raises several issues on appeal which were not
raised at the Trial Court level.

In addition, in the Brief of

Appellee, Ginger E. Rowe, her "Statement of Case" is only partially
correct and omits certain crucial facts; for example, plaintiff
omits that at the time of the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause
hearing on March 17, 1992, defendant had already filed his own
action to modify the Texas Decree (Case #92-4400164; (R Pg. 25);
which was consolidated before the Trial Court (R Pg. 199, Addendum,
Exhibit 1) at the said hearing. Therefore the Trial Court had not
only the plaintifffs request for enforcement of child support
payments, but also defendants request for modification based upon
his change of material circumstances at the hearing held on March
17, 1992.

Defendant made it clear in his pro se appearance that

he was unemployed and was before the Court for a modification (R.
Pg 703, Lines 22-24; Addendum, Exhibit 2).

The Commissioner

acknowledged this by stating, "Well, you have a right to come in
on your modification."
2) .

(R. Pg. 704, Lines 1-2; Addendum, Exhibit

But the Commissioner completely failed to address the issue

of the changed circumstances of the parties and simply enforced the
Stipulation, without obtaining any additional evidence. Defendant
contends this was error. Plaintiff contends that this was harmless
error—but it was not harmless to defendant since it made him
iv

liable for excessive child support payments from the date of the
Stipulation and made the same amounts enforceable against him
progressively, without taking into account the material changes in
circumstances of the parties.
compliance

to

the

All of this was done without

applicable

statutes

and

in

defendant's right to due process of the law.

violation

of

Further, the

plaintiff claims that if the Stipulation is not enforceable, then
the Satisfaction of Judgment signed by plaintiff is not valid.
However, the facts show that plaintiff received $11,000.00 for her
Satisfaction of Judgment and therefore has received consideration
and made the satisfaction binding.
ARGUMENT
I-

PLAINTIFF'S ISSUES NOT RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: THEREFORE

CANNOT BE RAISED NOW.
The plaintiff, in her reply brief, raises for the first time
the issues covering the following:
a.

Binding nature of the Stipulation on the Court;

b.

Statutory requirements were satisfied;

c.

Harmless error;

d.

Court's adoption of Stipulation supported by fact;

e.

Non-Waiver of Stipulation;

f.

Failure to marshall evidence;

g.

Meeting of the minds on the Stipulation; and

1

h.

No improper execution of the Order on Order to Show

Cause.
In fact, the plaintiff in the Court below never filed any
formal documents opposing the documents, affidavits, motions and
objection to the Commissioner's Order on Order to Show Cause filed
by defendant.

The only document filed by plaintiff was the

submittal request for a ruling to Judge Christensen (R Pg. 367;
Addendum, Exhibit 3) .
issues thereafter.

She thereby waived her right to raise any

Since none of the items (a) through (h) above

were raised at the Trial Court level, they cannot now be raised on
Appeal.

Wurst v. Dept. of Employment, 818 P. 2d 103 6 (Utah App.

1991) .

Further, a look at the transcript of the oral argument

before the Commissioner plainly shows that not only did plaintiff
not argue any of items (a) through (h) above, but that her sole
argument was that the Stipulation (R Pg. 108) either be enforced
or not be enforced (R Pg. 680; Addendum, Exhibit 2).
II.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS NOT BASED UPON THE RECORD.

Plaintiff alleges that she sent the Stipulation to the Court
on September 26, 1989 along with a cover letter indicating that
she was not represented by counsel; however, the record does not
show the original of this letter, nor is this statement supported.
In fact, a copy of it does not show up in the record until March
17, 1992, 2 1/2 years later, submitted by plaintifffs attorney at
2

the Order to Show Cause Hearing held March 17, 1992 (R 103 and
109).

Contrary to this, the letter from the Commissioner's clerk

to defendant's attorney rejecting the Stipulation and Order was
mailed on January 18, 1990, indicating that he was the one who in
fact filed the documents (R Pg. 87) .

The foregoing shows the

confusion in the mind of the plaintiff in remembering the facts.
However, it is clear from the defendant's letter of September 10,
1990 that the parties had earlier discussed

the matter and

plaintiff knew that the Stipulation had not been accepted by the
Court (R Pg. 191; Addendum, Exhibit 4) and in his affidavit,
defendant further states "he advised her (plaintiff) of the same"
(R Pg. 193, 57; Addendum, Exhibit 5).
was

not

being

paid

the

In addition, the plaintiff

$900.00 per

month

required

by the

Stipulation (see R Pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6) and defendant
told her this in early 1990 (R Pg. 191 Addendum, Exhibit 4).
Further, the statements in plaintiff's letter pertaining to her
being not represented by counsel are not correct since plaintiff's
attorney did not withdraw until October 20, 1989, well after
September 26 of the same year (R Pg. 86; Addendum, Exhibit 7).

In

addition, contrary to plaintiff's statements of fact that she was
not notified, both the Court's Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 88;
Addendum, Exhibit 8) and its Order of Dismissal

(R Pg. 96;

Addendum, Exhibit 9) show that plaintiff was copied by the Court.
3

In addition, the defendant notified plaintiff himself (R Pg. 193
f7; Addendum, Exhibit 5). Therefore, the record shows that the
plaintiff was well notified that the Stipulation had been rejected
by the Court.

But plaintiff did nothing; but why should she, she

was living in Colorado.
III.

HARMLESS ERROR

To argue that the actions of the Trial Court were harmless
error is to mistake the term. Harmless is if no injustice is done,
and there is no reasonable likelihood that the error effected the
outcome.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789 (Utah

1991) . While the defendant supports the proposition that adequate
child support needs to be paid, it needs to be assessed based upon
the guidelines passed by the Legislature and the Trial Court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. The plaintiff
bases her theory of harmless error on speculation and not facts
stated under oath before the Court.

The record is devoid of any

compliance with the applicable statutes.

Further, to say that

defendant is not harmed by the Courtfs actions is to ignore the
actualities of the case and facts as they exist before the Court.
Clearly defendant thought the Stipulation had been voided by the
Trial Court.

He wrote to plaintiff and told her so (R pg 191;

Addendum, Exhibit 4) in his letter of September 10, 1990, reminding
her of their earlier discussions on the subject, also reminding
4

plaintiff that she could not expect the $900.00 per month agreed
to in the Stipulation, as he was only bound by the $700.00 per
month Ordered by the Texas Divorce Decree. Plaintiff accepted the
lesser amount (R pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6). The plaintiff
made no attempt to change the Court's actions on the 1988 case
until 1992 when the defendant brought his action for modification
(case #92-4400164) (R pgs. 1-49), at which time she reasserted the
Stipulation. By asserting that the Trial Court committed harmless
error in adopting the Stipulation nunc-pro-tune, without complying
with § 78-45-7.3(3) or § 78-45-7, the plaintiff misses the vital
and cardinal fact that the defendant only raised this argument with
respect to the Order to Show Cause Hearing held on March 17, 1992.
The defendant accepts the actions of the Commissioner to be in
keeping with the statutes in what he did in 1988-89, in rejecting
the Stipulation, denying the Order, and dismissing the case.

But

it is his complete reversal on the March 17, 1992 Order to Show
Cause hearing — without any additional documents or facts, and in
contravention of the statutes, that defendant claims as error.
Further, the action of the Commissioner was harmful because:
(a)

Commissioner Substituted His Own Wisdom for That of the

Legislature.

The legislature has clearly said that when the

5

Commissioner has before him a modification request, he must obey
the following:
UTAH CODE ANN,

§ 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support Rebuttable guidelines.

(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a material
change of circumstances on the part of the obligor or obligee•
(2) If no prior Court Order exists, or a material
change
in circumstances has occurred, the Court
determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child
support using the guidelines before an Order awarding
child support or modifying an existing award may be
granted.
(3) If the Court finds sufficient evidence to rebut
the guidelines, the Court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the
child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the
obligee for the support of others.
If the matter is uncontested, the Court then has to follow the
following:

6

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-45-7.3

Procedure —
Stipulation

Documentation -

(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving
party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the
financial
verification
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and

required

by

(c) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent with
the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under
Subsection
(1)
is
not
available,
a
verified
representation of the defaulting party's income by the
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may
be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may
only be offered after a copy has been provided to the
defaulting party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative
Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving
parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii)
the
financial
verification
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and

required

by

(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent with
the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support Order
negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if
the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds

7

the total child support award required by the guidelines.
When the stipulated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be
awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2.
Whether the matter is contested or uncontested, it is obvious
that the Legislature wanted some documentation under oath from the
parties to indicate that the guidelines had been substantially met.
That the Commissioner did not do this on the March 17 Order to Show
Cause hearing is not argued.

(See page 10 of Appellee's Brief

where it is admitted.)
(b) Decisions Must be Based Upon Facts Before Court.
In her attempts to call the error harmless, the plaintiff has
cited allegations from pleadings filed by the defendant which were
not made under oath. Plaintiff has then speculated as to what the
defendant's income may have been in 1986, 1987, and 1988 to produce
a child support guideline which is not part of the record, and is
therefore objected to as speculative and irrelevant.

This is

exactly what the Legislature did not want judges to do. Plaintiff
then cites the Law Review Article by Judge Billings - which
appropriately enough was entitled "From Guesswork to Guidelines."
But the plaintiff's argument is simply just that —

"guesswork,"

since the Trial Court had failed to obtain the current evidence on
the parties1 financial status, and material changed circumstances,
if any, to give it some evidence to comply with the guidelines.

8

(c) Commissioner Violated Due Process,
In

both

the

1988

hearing

and

the

1992

hearing,

the

Commissioner had before him the modification of the Texas decree.
In one instance, he applied the statutes, in the second, he did
not, without any further evidence before him.

This provides for

an unpredictable, uneven, and personalized standard of justice that
the Legislature has tried to avoid and Courts must not allow to
happen.

Perhaps the greatest harm was that the defendant was not

allowed his day in Court. By not following the statutes, the Court
deprived him of due process by not allowing him to state his
material change of circumstances upon which the Court could have
then made an informed decision.

It does not matter what the

parties agreed to in 1988 in the Stipulation if the circumstances
have materially

changed—the

evidence on the change.
has essentially

Trial Court must

listen to the

THIS THE COURT FAILED TO DO.

been denied

due process of the

Defendant

law by the

Commissioner's actions. Because the defendant signed a Stipulation
in 1988 based upon his circumstances and ability to pay child
support at that time, does not mean that he is bound by it for the
rest of his life.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-45-7(1) allows for the

modification and case law allows for voidance and repudiation of
a Stipulation,

Kline v. Kline, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975) and

they are not binding upon the Courts, Clawson v. Clawson, 675 P.2d
9

562 (Utah 198 3). Therefore, the Commissioner, based upon a reading
of the Stipulation only, and without any supporting evidence, and
upon the false premise that the Stipulation had not been filed with
him in the 1988 case, adopted the Stipulation. This was also based
upon the false premise that the Stipulation was binding upon the
parties because plaintiff had given a Satisfaction of Judgment in
a Utah Administrative Law suit. However, the record clearly shows
the payment of $11,000.00 to plaintiff as consideration for the
same (R Pg. 136; Addendum, Exhibit 11) .

In addition, since the

Stipulation was never adopted in 1988, it does not follow that if
the Commissioner's Order, on Order to Show Cause is set aside, that
the Satisfaction of Judgment must also be set aside.

The law

provides for changes in conditions of the parties which would
permit the reduction of child support and therefore upon a proper
showing, the child support part of the Stipulation may be modified
without the Satisfaction of Judgment also being set aside since the
modification is based upon material changed conditions.

But the

Court must hear evidence to determine if the changed conditions are
in fact material and would in fact allow for a modification to the
Texas

decree.

It

is

clear

that

Commissioner

Maetani

was

sidetracked by the arguments of plaintiff's attorney at the oral
presentation of March 17, 1992. But it was only argument and the
Commissioner should not have been persuaded that he only had two
10

decisions before him, i.e., the enforcement or the non-enforcement
of the Stipulation (R Pg. 680; Addendum, Exhibit 2) nor that the
only thing he had before him was the question of the Stipulation
(R Pg. 691, lines 10-12; Addendum, Exhibit 2) and that it was
controlling (R Pg. 687, lines 7-8; Addendum, Exhibit 2).

As the

record shows, the Commissioner, upon the urging of plaintiff's
attorney, was convinced that the entire question of the enforcement
of the Stipulation evolved around the failure of defendant's
attorney to file the same in 1988. He states this seventeen (17)
times in the transcript

(R Pgs. 679, 683

(twice), 684, 685

(thrice), 692, 695 (twice) 696, 704, 705 & 708; Addendum, Exhibit
2).

That this belief was plain error is evidenced by his clerk's

letter

(R Pg. 121; Addendum, Exhibit 10) indicating that the

Stipulation had been filed and rejected by him in 1988. Surely the
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 1983 is applicable to the case
at bar when it held:
An error is reversible if there is a reasonable
likelihood that more a favorable result would have been
obtained by complaining party, in absence of error.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217-222. Had the Trial
Court taken evidence on the parties' income and financial status
as required

by the

statutes cited

above, a different, more

favorable result must occur since the defendant was unemployed at
the time (R Pg. 703, Lines 22-24; Addendum, Exhibit 2) and he told
11

the Commissioner so at the March 17, 1992 Order to Show Cause
hearing.

But

the

Commissioner

imposed

upon

him

the

1988

Stipulation on the theory that he was bound by it because his
lawyer had failed to file it. At the March 17, 1992 Order to Show
Cause hearing, the Commissioner failed to take sufficient evidence
on the parties1 financial status and thus prevented defendant from
fully stating his case.

Defendant was not given the opportunity

by the Trial Court to state his case for modification.

In a

similar case, the Supreme Court held:
Cumulative error in exclusion of evidence offered
by manufacturers of vehicle in products liability action
required reversal of judgment in favor of injured
passenger; manufacturer was unable to present to jury his
theory of case and was deprived of fair trial.
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp. , 801 P.2d 920, 928. By not
following the statutory guidelines as evidenced above., and by
omitting evidence which would have been provided thereby, the Court
committed harmful error which prejudiced the Courtfs decision and
the defendant's rights to a fair hearing.
IV.

IMPROPER EXECUTION.

Defendant acknowledges that its claim to improper execution
of the Order on Order to Show Cause is moot.

When the District

Court gave defendant the record for its appeal brief, it never gave
him file #924400164. Therefore, defendant never had any knowledge

12

of the original signature of Commissioner Maetani on the Order
until the file was given to him by the District Court recently.
V.

ESTOPPEL,

Finally, the plaintiff has argued that defendant's estoppel
argument is barred because it was not raised at the Trial Court
level.

But the transcript of the March 17, 1992 Order to Show

Cause hearing indicates that the defendant acting pro se did
attempt to raise this issue with Commissioner Maetani when he said:
MR. ROWE: Well, we've agreed for all this time
until now, until the point when I became in a hard
position. She's been taking all these monies that I've
been paying for a year and a half and never made any
issue out of anything. I've got all my checks —
(R Pg. 691, Lines 4-9; Addendum, Exhibit 2).

While this was not

stated as an attorney would state it, it is sufficient to indicate
to the Commissioner that plaintiff had done nothing for 1 1/2
years.

In fact, the record shows she did nothing from October of

1988 until February of 1992 (almost 3 1/2 years) .

It must be

remembered that due to his unemployed state, defendant appeared at
the March 17 Order to Show Cause Hearing pro se. What he said and
presented to the Commissioner did not become a part of the record
until October 30, 1992, long after the final Order by Judge
Christensen dated June 4, 1992.

Therefore, and for the above

stated reasons, the claim for estoppel was not refined in the
objection documents, although it was argued to and ignored by the
13

Commissioner.

However, there are recognizable exceptions to the

hard and fast rule barring issues on appeal that were not raised
on the Trial Court level.
189, 198 (Utah App. 1991).

LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 804 P.2d
These exceptions include plain error

committed at the Trial Court level and when the interests of
justice require it. Defendant submits that the case at bar is just
such a case.
CONCLUSION
Due to the plaintiff's failure to file any formal arguments
opposing the documents, motions, affidavits, and objections, or to
make any arguments on oral argument, the arguments raised in her
reply brief (a) throucjh (h) above* should not be considered by the
Court. Essentially, all the plaintiff did at the Trial Court level
was to file the Stipulation at the March 17, 1992 Order to Show
Cause hearing, and ask the Court to enforce it.
did nothing.
claims

of

Thereafter, they

But since the Trial Court clearly had before it the

the

parties with

respect

to material

changes of

circumstances, and request for modification of the Texas decree,
the

Trial

Court

should

have

gone

further

and

followed

the

applicable statutes and obtained information under oath from the
parties.

By not doing so, the Trial Court committed plain error,

violated

the

defendant's

rights

and

rendered

an

uninformed

decision. To state that the foregoing is harmless error is to make
14

mockery of the concept.

This Court should vacate both the

Commissioner's and Judge Christensen1s Orders and remand the case
back to the Commissioner to take further evidence and render a
decision in compliance with the applicable statutes and facts which
would then be before the Court.
DATED this

£C7 day of May, 1993.
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